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THE ACQUISITION OF MECHANICS' AND




I. INTRODUCTIONF OR a period of several years attorneys for trade associations
representing the building industries have manifested an interest
in a simplification of the statutes governing the liens of mechanics
and materialmen. An effort will be made in this Article to suggest
some problems which should be considered by those undertaking a
study of the statutes with a view toward their improvement. While
it is hoped that the materials presented here will be of assistance to
those practicing under the present statutes, it will be even more grat-
ifying if this Article plays a part in bringing about needed changes.
Limitations on space prevent a complete study in one article. As
a consequence, major attention will be directed toward the methods
by which the various types of liens may be acquired on nonexempt
property. The special problems relating to liens on the homestead
cannot be treated.1 Only cursory mention is made of the special
statutes dealing with liens on mineral properties and pipelines. While
some discussion of priority questions is essential, it has been possible
to outline only a few of the basic principles.
By way of historical introduction, it can be said that the lien of
the mechanic and materialman upon real property is wholly statu-
tory in origin, there having been nothing comparable at common
law." There are occasional statements that our American statutes were
borrowed from the civil law,' but it seems more probable that they
are domestic in origin and were enacted to encourage the develop-
* B.A., University of Texas; M.A., West Texas State College; LL.B., University of
Texas; Author, Texas Cases and Materials on Real Property Security, 2d ed. 1954;
Co-author (with Huie and Walker), Cases and Materials on Oil and Gas, 1960; Professor
of Law, University of Texas.
The substance of this Article was presented at the First Annual Shipboard Institute of
the Houston Bar Association, April 16-22, 1960. The basic research was done while the
writer was the recipient of a Sterling Fellowship in Law at Yale University.
'For brief discussions of some of these problems see Cole, The Homestead Provisions
in the Texas Constitution, 3 Texas L. Rev. 217 (1925); Woodward, The Homestead Ex-
emption: A Continuing Need for Constitutional Revision, 35 Texas L. Rev. 1047 (1957);
Comment, 7 Baylor L. Rev. 433 (1955); Comment, 17 Texas L. Rev. 469 (1939).
'Timber Structures, Inc. v. C.W.S. Grinding & Mach. Works, 191 Ore. 231, 229
P.2d 623 (1951); Lippencott v. York, 86 Tex. 276, 24 S.W. 275 (1893).
'Canal Co. v. Gordon, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 561 (1867). See also 36 Am. Jur. Me-
chanics Liens § 3, at 19 (1941).
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ment of cities under conditions peculiar to this country during the
last century.4
The first American statute was enacted to expedite the develop-
ment of the new capitol city of Washington, but it protected only
those master builders who contracted directly with the owner of the
property. In time the statute was enlarged for the protection of cer-
tain derivative claimants against the insolvency or dishonesty of a
prime contractor.! Protection for derivative claimants can come, of
course, only through the imposition of burdens on the owner of the
property for the benefit of persons with whom he has had no direct
dealings. With this development it was inevitable that there should
be difficulties for both legislators and judges in attempting to bring
about some fair and reasonable balance between the conflicting in-
terests of the owner and the derivative claimants. Complexity neces-
sarily resulted. The following discussion proves that Texas has not
escaped a fair share of the difficulties.
II. THE NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIEN
The unusual complexity of the Texas law of mechanics' liens can
be explained in part by the fact that in addition to the lien created
by statute, there exists independently a lien created by the constitu-
tion. Article XVI, § 37, of the Texas Constitution provides:
Mechanics, artisans, and materialmen, of every class, shall have a lien
on the buildings and articles made or repaired by them for the value of
their labor done thereon, or material furnished therefor; and the Legis-
lature shall provide by law for the speedy and efficient enforcement of
said liens.
It is now established beyond question that this provision is self-exe-
cuting and that it exists independently of any statute.7
4 In Macondray v. Simmons, 1 Cal. 393, 395 (1851), the court said:
We find it laid down in the Mexican books, that he who loans money for the
purpose of building, repairing, or supplying a ship, house, or other building,
has a tacit lien thereon for the reimbursement of his loan. . . . But we do
not find . . . that a person who furnishes materials for the erection of a
building has any lien. . . . There is nothing, therefore, in the Mexican law,
which countenances the plaintiff's claim of lien, and though it might be in-
ferred from Browne that such a lien would be sanctioned by the civil law,
yet the inference is equally strong from Mackeldy that it would not.
In Kneeland, A Treatise Upon the Principles Governing the Acquisition and Enforce-
ment of Mechanic's Liens 12 (2d ed. 1882), the writer, after stating that the lien did not
exist in England, observed, "But in a country where improvements are gradual, and real
estate is held by a wealthy and conservative class, no real demand arises for such a law."
'See Monroe v. Hannan, 3 L.R.A. 549, 551 (D.C. 1889); Kneeland, op. cit. supra
note 4.
6 See Winder v. Caldwell, 20 U.S. (14 How.) 272 (1852).
7Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Taylor, 91 Tex. 78, 40 S.W. 876 (1897);
Strang v. Pray, 89 Tex. 525, 35 S.W. 1054 (1896); Ferrell v. Ertell, 100 S.W.2d 1084
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Although the impression to be gained from article 5453' is that
one claiming the constitutional lien must follow the statutory pro-
cedure in order to make it effective,' the contrary intention has been
ascribed to the legislature in order to avoid a construction which
would render the statute unconstitutional." In a leading case the
court said:
The lien does not depend upon the statute, and the legislature has no
power to affix to that lien conditions of forfeiture. It may, under the
constitution, provide means for enforcing the lien, and, in doing so, may
prescribe such things to be done as may be deemed necessary for the
protection of the owner or purchasers of such property-a limitation
on the time for the enforcement of such lien, and such other things as
pertain to the remedy."
Thus, on the occurrence of the facts mentioned in the constitution,
a lien which is valid as between the parties'2 and as to all third per-
sons with notice'" is created irrespective of compliance with the stat-
utes.
It is settled, of course, that the more specific provision of the con-
stitution relating to the formalities necessary to create a lien for im-
provements on the homestead' overrides the general terms of article
XVI, § 37, so that there can be no lien on the homestead in the ab-
sence of a written contract executed with all of the formalities re-
quired by the constitution and the statutes." Similarly, the statutory
formalities are necessary to create a lien on the wife's separate proper-
ty.16
It should be noted that the constitutional lien is not limited in
its application to real property, but exists as 'well for the benefit of
artisans who make or repair chattels or one who furnishes material
(Tex. Civ. App. 1936) error dism. The opposite result was reached in Spinney v. Griffith,
98 Cal. 149, 32 Pac. 974 (1893), which construed an almost identical provision in the
Constitution of California.
8 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1958).
'It seems probable that this was the legislative intent. See Huck v. Gaylord, 50 Tex.
578 (1879).
"°Strang v. Pray, 89 Tex. 525, 35 S.W. 1054 (1896).
" Id. at 1056.
"See Strang v. Pray, 89 Tex. 525, 35 S.W. 1054 (1896); Rifkin v. Overbey, 171
S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) error ref.; Ferrell v. Ertell, 100 S.W.2d 1084 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1936) error dism.
"Reeves v. York Eng'r & Supply Co., 249 Fed. 513 (5th Cir. 1918); Farmers &
Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Taylor, 91 Tex. 78, 40 S.W. 876 (1897).
14 Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 50.
"See Kepley v. Zachry, 131 Tex. 554, 116 S.W.2d 699, 121 S.W.2d 595 (1938).
" Mann Elec. Co. v. Phillips, 177 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1949). See Brick & Tile Co. v.
Parker, 143 Tex. 383, 186 S.W.2d 66 (1945). The result may be different if the wife
has elected to manage her separate property under the procedure permitted by article 4614,
as amended, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1958).
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for such work." Unlike the common-law artisan's lien, the constitu-
tional lien is in no way dependent upon retention of possession of the
chattel. The application of the constitutional lien to chattels has re-
ceived separate treatment elsewhere and will receive only incidental
attention in this Article. s
III. SCOPE OF PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIEN
The constitutional provision quoted above is couched in plain and
simple language; yet the courts have had numerous occasions to con-
strue it. It will be noted that it does not provide for a lien for any-
one who makes a contribution toward the improvement of real
property. Only "mechanics, artisans, and materialmen, of every
class," are favored. Moreover, the lien arises only when "buildings
or articles" have been "made or repaired," although the claimant
who does no labor may have a lien if he furnishes material for such
making or repairing.
At first glance, it would seem to be easy to distinguish between
those claimants who are entitled to a constitutional lien and those
who are beyond the scope of the language granting it. For example,
it could be stated categorically that no lien would arise in favor of
a person who did nothing but haul materials to the building site.
Yet, in the first case in which it was established that the constitu-
tion itself created a lien, it was held that a claimant who had en-
tered into a contract to furnish all labor and materials and to con-
struct a house in accordance with certain specifications was entitled
to a lien for the entire contract price; and this decision has never
been questioned."9 It seems obvious that a number of items must have
been included in that price which standing alone could not give rise
to the lien. To illustrate, it seems that the contractor must have in-
cluded in the price, of necessity, the cost of transporting the ma-
terials to the lot where the house was erected. As a practical matter,
it would be almost impossible for the contractor to separate from
the contract price those items of cost which are expressly covered
by the constitutional language and to establish his lien for these
items only. Certainly, at the time the cases were first arising, and
probably even today, few contractors could ascribe with any ac-
curacy the portion of the price attributable to the skilled labor of
" Shirley-Self Motor Co. v. Simpson, 195 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946); Lintner
v. Neely, 97 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) error dism.; Wichita Falls Sash & Door
Co. v. Jackson, 203 S.W. 100 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
'
5 See Woodward, The Constitutional Lien on Chattels in Texas, 28 Texas L. Rev. 305
(1950).
"°Strang v. Pray, 89 Tex. 525, 35 S.W. 1054 (1896).
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the artisan and mechanic, which is covered by the language quoted,
and the portion performed by the unskilled laborer, which standing
alone is not. Entirely aside from the practical aspects, however, it
seems that the inclusion of some items within the coverage of the
lien presents no very difficult problem of interpretation when the
claimant has agreed to a "turn-key" job. The substance of a single
transaction may be described in different terms with possible differ-
ences in result. Stated in one way, the contract price includes the costs
of hauling materials, an item not covered by the language of the
constitution. Stated in another, the value of the materials is covered
by the express language of the constitution, and this must mean
their value at the place where they are incorporated into the build-
ing. In other words, the transportation cost is a proper part of the
value of the materials at the site.
It may be more difficult to make a justification on this same level
of all other items necessarily included in the ordinary general con-
tract. To illustrate, unskilled work of the common laborer is a nec-
essary part of the construction of every building, and it would have
been arguable, as an initial proposition, that the constitutional lien
secures only the value of the skilled labor of the artisan or mechanic.
Even in this instance, however, it can be said that the contractor is
an artisan, and all of the labor furnished by him, skilled or other-
wise, is attributable to his status. Surely, the brickmason, working
under a direct contract with the owner, should have a lien, not only
for his own services but also for the value of the labor of his as-
sistants, which was necessary to make his own skills effective. In any
event, these questions have caused no trouble and are likely to cause
none in the future since there have been too many decisions in which
a general contractor has been held to have a constitutional lien to
secure the entire contract price.
Frequently there is no general contract for the construction of a
building, and the owner enters into direct contractual relations with
materialmen and those who would normally be subcontractors, or
sometimes with persons who would be employed, under more usual
circumstances, by either the general contractor or subcontractors.
Thus, the owner may buy materials directly from a number of ma-
terialmen; may enter into separate contracts for plumbing and elec-
trical work; employ carpenters, masons, and painters; and, in effect,
act as his own general contractor. Here definitions may become im-
portant.
There has been no particular difficulty in determining who is a
1960]
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materialman. 5 In order for a sale of materials to create a lien, how-
ever, they must have been sold with reference to a particular par-
cel of land, or stated differently, they must have been sold with the
expectation on the part of the seller that they would be incorporated
into a building upon a particular tract.2' Even so, it is not essential
that all of the materials actually be used for the contemplated pur-
pose. Where the materialman delivers the materials to the building
site, or other place designated by the owner, he is entitled to a lien for
the entire amount although the owner may have re-sold part of the
materials or put them to other uses.2
The word materials, as used in the constitution, has been held to
include not only such raw materials as lumber, which may require
further fabrication before use, but also machinery and other finished,
manufactured articles."3 An example is found in Reeves v. York
Eng'r & Supply Co.,4 in which machinery for the manufacture of
ice was installed, under the supervision of the seller, on a concrete
slab adjacent to a building which was used as an ice plant. It was
bolted to the slab and was thus easily removable. However, in view
of the fact that the machinery was essential to the operation of the
plant as a functioning institution, it was regarded by the court as
an integral part of the building. In determining whether a lien on
the real estate will result in such a case, the courts will apparently
apply the same nebulous tests that would be employed in determin-
ing whether the chattel became a fixture." In some of the cases it
has been unnecessary to give careful consideration to the question
whether the sale or installation of such fixtures as plumbing equip-
20 For definitions of "materialman" see Huddleston v. Nislar, 72 S.W.2d 959, 962 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1934) error ref. The case, and the authorities cited in it, distinguish contractors
and subcontractors from materialmen who sell or furnish material "without performing
any work or labor in installing or putting them in place." See also St. Louis A. & T. Ry.
v. Matthews, 75 Tex. 92, 12 S.W. 976 (1889).
" In re Wigzell, 7 F. Supp. 463 (W.D. Tex. 1933). See Reeves v. York Eng'r &
Supply Co., 249 Fed. 513, 517 (5th Cir. 1918); Campbell v. Teeple, 273 S.W. 304 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1925).
22Brick & Tile Co. v. Parker, 143 Tex. 383, 186 S.W.2d 66 (1945); Trammel v.
Mount, 68 Tex. 210, 4 S.W. 377 (1887). In the latter case a part of the materials were
prepared for delivery and stored at a place near the building site, but the owner wrong-
fully refused to accept delivery. In the Parker case, the court makes the point that the
land involved was not homestead.
"Reeves v. York Eng'r & Supply Co., 249 Fed. 513 (5th Cir. 1918); Dallas Plumbing
Co. v. Harrington, 275 S.W. 190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). See Interstate Trust & Banking
Co. v. West Texas Util. Co., 88 S.W.2d 1110 (Tex. Civ, App. 1935). See also Fagan &
Osgood v. Boyle Ice Mach. Co., 65 Tex. 324 (1886).
'4 Supra note 23.
"In addition to the Reeves case, see Carter v. Straus-Frank Co., 297 S.W.2d 195 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.; McConnell v. Frost, 45 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. Civ. App.
1932) error ref.; Black, Sivalls & Bryson v. Operators' Oil & Gas Co., 37 S.W.2d 313
(Tex. Civ. App. 1930) error dism. But see Freed v. Bozman, 304 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1957) error ref. n.r.e.
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ment, fans, and other manufactured articles created a lien on the
real estate itself or only on the chattels, " since the dispute has cen-
tered on the right of the supplier, as against one holding a prior lien
on the real estate, to remove the chattel and have it sold apart from
the land under article 5459.17 On analysis it would appear that the
lien in such cases attaches to the land " although the priority of the
supplier is limited to the chattel alone and is conditioned on his abil-
ity to remove it without material injury to the real estate.2
As far as labor is concerned, only that of the artisan and mechanic
is mentioned by the constitution. A mechanic has been defined as
one who is "skilled in the practical use of tools," and, similarly, an
artisan has been defined as "one trained for manual dexterity in
some mechanic art or trade."" Both definitions seem to embody the
components of skill in craftsmanship and of manual labor. Hence,
it would seem that a common laborer could not qualify as an artisan
or mechanic because his work is unskilled.' Conversely, it would
seem that the architect who plans or designs a building could not
qualify since his work arises above that which is purely mechanical
and because the element of manual labor is missing. 2 On the other
hand, it has been held that a person employed to hire and supervise
workmen may be regarded as a mechanic or artisan."3
On the whole, the cases have not yet given careful consideration
to the types of vocations protected by the words "mechanics and
artisans," and a good deal is left open to speculation. An illustration
is found in Hill v. The Praetorians," where the claimant, acting un-
der a contract with the owner of the property, hauled materials
2 See, e.g., Freed v. Bozman, supra note 25; Dallas Plumbing Co. v. Harrington, 275
S.W. 190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
2 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1958).
" This must be true since the constitutional lien on a chattel, apart from real estate,
arises only when a chattel is made or repaired. See Woodward, supra note 18, at 318.
"SSee Hamman v. H.J. McMullen & Co., 122 Tex. 476, 62 S.W.2d 59 (1933).
"0 Warner Memorial Univ. v. Ritenour, 56 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) error ref.
" See Warner Memorial Univ. v. Ritenour, supra note 30; McQuerry v. Glenn, I S.W.2d
339 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) error dism.
32 See Sanguinett & Statts v. Colorado Salt Co., 150 S.W. 490 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912)
error ref. (dealing with the statute of 1897, Sayles Ann. Civ. Stat. art. 3924). In Warner
Memorial Univ. v. Ritenour, 56 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) error ref., the
court distinguishes between an artisan and an artist with the following quotation at 237:
A portrait painter is an artist; a sign painter is an artisan, although he may
have the taste and skill of an artist. The occupation of the former requires a
fine taste and delicate manipulation; that of the latter demands only an ordinary
degree of contrivance and imitative power.
"°Mood v. Methodist Episcopal Church, 300 S.W. 30 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927). Cf.
Texas Bldg. Co. v. Collins, 187 S.W. 404 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) error ref. See Huffman v.
McDonald, 261 S.W. 146 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924), holding that a subcontractor who per-
formed no labor himself but who supervised others was not a mechanic or artisan within
the meaning of article 5469, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1958).
34219 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) error ref. n.r.e.
1960]
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(which he did not sell) for the construction of the building. He
also furnished the labor and equipment for cutting pipe for the
building. It was held, as an alternative ground for decision, that he
was entitled to a constitutional lien for both items. It seems doubtful
that a truck driver should be classed as either a mechanic or material-
man, 5 or that the hauling of materials should be regarded as the
"furnishing" of materials, or that one performing this service alone
could be regarded as a materialman." The decision seems correct as
to the claim for cutting pipe. Although the agreement was to pay for
the labor at a certain rate and for the use of the cutting equipment at
another, the fact that the total charge was thus broken down should
not defeat the right to a lien for a portion of it, even though the
mere rental of equipment without the labor would not have given
rise to a lien. Artisans frequently supply their own tools and equip-
ment, and, if in an unusual agreement, they assign separate values to
their labor and to the use of the tools employed by them, this should
not defeat the lien for a portion of the claim, which would have been
allowed in full if a lump-sum amount had been agreed upon.
As previously observed, the constitution purports to give the lien
only when "buildings or articles" are "made or repaired." If the
improvement on real property cannot be regarded as either an article
or building, then no lien arises out of the constitution. Thus, the
installation of sewer lines and water mains in a subdivision, entirely
unconnected with any building then existing or under construction,
creates no constitutional lien because such improvements are neither
buildings nor articles." Under ordinary circumstances, one who
builds a fence or furnishes materials therefor is not entitled to the
constitutional lien, for a fence is neither a building nor an article."
It appears, however, that if a fence and house are constructed as a
part of a single contract, and the fence is considered to be a part of
and appurtenant to the house, then the lien may attach to secure
the entire contract price." It has been suggested, although not
authoritatively determined, that the word "building," as used in the
constitution, "includes only those structures which have the capacity
3' In Warner Memorial Univ. v. Ritenour, 56 S.W.2d 236, 237 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933)
error ref., one of the definitions of mechanic is "a workman who shapes and applies ma-
terial in the building of a house or other structure. Similarly, one of the definitions
of an artisan is a "handicraftsman."
" See Huddleston v. Nislar, 72 S.W.2d 959 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
" Campbell v. City of Dallas, 120 S.W.2d 1095 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) error ref.
" In re Wigzell, 7 F. Supp. 463 (W.D. Tex. 1933).
"
5See Strang v. Pray, 89 Tex. 525, 35 S.W. 1054 (1896), distinguished in the Wigzell
case, supra note 38. The facts in Strang v. Pray do not suggest that there was any physical
connection of the house and fence.
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to contain and are designed for the habitation of man or animals
or the shelter of property."4 The furnishing of labor or material for
most of the ordinary work done in connection with drilling oil, gas,
or water wells cannot be the foundation for constitutional liens."
Again, while such wells are undoubtedly improvements, they are
not classified as either buildings or articles." Moreover, the casing
which has been set in a well, even if regarded as an "article," has not
been "made or repaired" by those who have set it into place. The
point is further illustrated by Byrne v. Williams," in which an
artisan repaired a gas engine and, at the request of the owner, in-
stalled it for demonstration purposes in the building of a prospective
purchaser to whom the owner hoped to sell it. While recognizing the
artisan's constitutional lien for the value of his services in making
the repairs, the court stated that the value of the installation was not
part of the value of the repair of the article. Obviously there could
be no lien on the building of the prospective purchaser under the
circumstances.
The constitution purports to give a lien to artisans, mechanics,
and materialmen "of every class," and the language contains no
suggestion that the grant of the lien is restricted to those who have
direct contractual dealings with the owner of the property. It is
settled, however, that it is only such persons (who are denominated
"original contractors") who may claim the benefits of the con-
40 Peterson v. Stolz, 269 S.W. 113 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) error ref., in which the
court refused to declare and enforce a constitutional lien upon a mausoleum primarily
upon the ground of public policy.
4"Ball v. Davis, 118 Tex. 534, 18 S.W.2d 1063 (1929); Eoff v. Skinner, 244 S.W.2d
991 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Mulloy v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 250 S.W. 792 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1923).
" The court in Mulloy v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., supra note 41, stated: "Certainly
an oil well is not a building. The word 'article' is of broad significance, but if an oil
and gas well is to be regarded as a mere 'article,' then it would be difficult to imagine
an instance of labor done or material furnished which would not fall within the meaning
of the term."
4 In Ball v. Davis, 118 Tex. 534, 545, 18 S.W.2d 1063, 1067 (1929), the court said:
[W]e are convinced that no one would class a well casing put together and
set in a well as an "article made." In this particular instance the casing
was set in the well in the usual way, each joint being attached to the other
by threads, . . . and we are convinced that the common and general under-
standing of men would not be that in thus setting a casing in a well those
engaged in performance of the duty had "made" a well casing .... The well
casing was well casing before it was placed in the well, and was well casing
afterwards. Nothing has been made in the usual and ordinary meaning of the
word "made" but only a use has been made of articles completely manu-
factured.
The situation is the same when casing is perforated or slotted by the contractor, in addi-
tion to being set in place. Eoff v. Skinner, 244 S.W.2d 991 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
44 45 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) error ref.
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stitutional lien." Those with whom the owner has contracted directly
for either labor or materials, or both, are called original contractors."'
Actually, it has not been determined whether those who furnish
labor or materials to a contractor or subcontractor, rather than the
owner, obtain the lien by virtue of the constitution but cannot en-
force it without compliance with the statutes, or whether no lien
arises in their favor." Insofar as the lien on real property is concerned,
the question seems to be of academic interest only." If the lien arises,
but is unenforceable even as against the owner and others having
knowledge of the claim, unless the lien is fixed by timely notice to
the owner and by filing, it is equivalent to saying that such persons
can obtain a statutory lien only. This construction which gives an
enforceable lien only to original contractors and those who follow
the statutory procedures is the only one which could be given as a
practical matter. Otherwise, the owner might find his property
subjected to liens for amounts far in excess of the contract price,
and in favor of persons of whom he had never heard until after he
had paid the full contract price to the original contractor.
In the event that the statutes are revised, it would be desirable
to broaden the benefits of the constitutional lien. While no lien could
be given to a larger class of persons by the constitution without an
amendment to that document itself, a statutory lien having the
same incidents, and requiring no formalities insofar as the parties to
the contract and third persons with notice are concerned, could be
given by legislative enactment. It would seem that those who supply
machinery, fuel, or tools, and all who perform work, whether they
be architects or unskilled laborers, should have the same protection.
Moreover, it should be immaterial whether the improvement is a
building or some other valuable permanent improvement.
IV. SCOPE OF THE STATUTORY LIEN
While the constitutional hen is limited to a specified class of per-
sons and, as applied to real property, arises only out of the making
and repairing of buildings, the statutes are much broader. Article
5452 4 grants a lien to almost anyone who contributes to the im-
provement of real property, provided proper steps are taken to affix
" First Nat'l Bank v. Lyon-Gray Lumber Co., 110 Tex. 162, 217 S.W. 133 (1919);
Baumann v. Cibolo Lumber Co., 226 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) error ref.
46See Brick & Tile, Inc. v. Parker, 143 Tex. 383, 186 S.W.2d 66 (1945).
" Berry v. McAdams, 93 Tex. 431, 55 S.W. 1112 (1900). See also Bassett v. Mills, 89
Tex. 162, 34 S.W. 93 (1896).
4 The question may have practical importance insofar as the lien on chattels is con-
cerned. See Woodward, supra note 18, at 317.
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1958).
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and perfect it. While no attempt will be made here to paraphrase
the statute, it may be mentioned that it protects not only those who
furnish labor or material, but also those furnishing machinery, fix-
tures, or tools for the erection or repair of any improvement.
While the wording leaves something to be desired, it is clear that
the words "erection or repair" are used in a very broad sense. The
improvement may be "any improvement whatever," and it is speci-
fied that the word shall include, among other things, wells, cisterns,
tanks, reservoirs, and devices for raising and storing water. By ex-
press provision, the reclamation of land from overflow, the clearing
and grubbing of land, and the planting, pruning, and replacement of
orchard trees are all items covered by the statutory lien. The lien ex-
ists not only in favor of artisans, mechanics, and materialmen, but
is for the benefit of any person, firm, or corporation which may
make any of the specified contributions to the improvement. Sub-
contractors are expressly mentioned and it is clear that derivative
claimants" as well as original contractors are protected. Special stat-
utes," also very broad in terms, have been enacted for the protec-
tion of those who do work or haul or furnish materials, tools, or
supplies for most of the work done in connection with the drilling
or digging of oil or gas wells, mines or quarries, or the operation
of such properties."2 Space limitations will not permit an exploration
of these statutes which deal specifically with mineral properties.
While the statutes are very comprehensive, neither they nor the
constitution protect one who merely advances money to pay for
labor or materials.3
V. PROCEEDINGS NECESSARY FOR THE PERFECTION OF LIENS
A. Original Contractors
As already observed, the constitutional lien arises automatically,
and nothing need be done by the claimant in order to make it
5 Bassett v. Mills, 89 Tex. 162, 34 S.W. 93 (1896).
"'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 5472, 5473 (1958). While article 5479, Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. Ann. (1958), states that these special statutes relating to mineral properties
"shall not be construed to deprive or abridge . . . any rights given to claimants under other
statutes," and that the special statutes "shall be cumulative of the present lien laws," the
special statutes have nevertheless been held to provide the exclusive remedy in the area of
their coverage. Ball v. Davis, 118 Tex. 534, 18 S.W.2d 1063 (1929).
" While these statutes are very comprehensive they do not cover all work. An example
is found in Big Three Welding Equip. Co. v. Crutcher, Rolfs, Cummings, Inc., 149 Tex.
204, 229 S.W.2d 600 (1950), which holds that work done in dismantling a pipeline, in-
cluding hauling and conditioning of pipe, is not protected by the lien. Although the statute
covers work done in operating and maintaining a pipeline, it does not include work done
in dismantling.
" Gaylord v. Loughridge, 50 Tex. 573 (1879); Owen v. Griffin, 34 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1931). Circumstances under which a lender might be subrogated to constitu-
tional and statutory liens are not considered in this Article.
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effective against the owner of the property and third persons with
notice." If the lien is to be enforceable against subsequent bona
fide purchasers for value, however, the claimant must follow the
statutory procedure for the perfection of the lien. If the claimant
had a written contract with the owner, he must file it for recording
in the county where the land is located. 5 If there were no written
contract, an itemized account of the claim, supported by an affidavit
showing that the account is just and correct and that all just and
lawful offsets and payments have been allowed, must be filed." The
form of the affidavit is prescribed by statute."
Although there is little authority on the subject, it appears that
substantial compliance with the statute will be sufficient,"8 as the
courts have generally construed the constitution and the statutes lib-
erally in favor of the claimant of the constitutional lien."' It seems
to be enough to state the nature of the claim and the total amount
due without an itemization." If a written contract is filed, it must
be accompanied by a description of the improvement and the land
on which it is located, but the description need not be under oath.
The statutory form for the itemized account which is filed in the ab-
sence of a written contract likewise provides for a description of the
land. While the same rules which are used to test the sufficiency of
the description in a conveyance are generally stated by the courts as
applicable to this statute, they have indulged a greater liberality than
is generally shown in the conveyancing cases." An original contrac-
tor must file his contract or itemized account within four months
after the indebtedness accrues."
It is significant that the date from which the time begins to run
is the date of the accrual of the indebtedness rather than the date
"'See text accompanying notes 11, 12 supra.
5 Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 5453 (1) (1958).
5' Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5453 (2) (1958).
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5455 (1958).
" Newman v. Coker, 310 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Hill v. The Praetorians,
219 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) error ref. n.r.e.
"See, e.g., Reeves v. York Eng'r & Supply Co., 249 Fed. 513 (5th Cir. 1918); Strang
v. Pray, 89 Tex. 525, 35 S.W. 1054 (1896); Bassett v. Mills, 89 Tex. 162, 34 S.W. 93
(1896).
" Reeves v. York Eng'r & Supply Co., supra note 59; Newman v. Coker, 310 S.W.2d
354 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
11 See, e.g., Reeves v. York Eng'r & Supply Co., 249 Fed. 513 (5th Cir. 1918); Myers
v. Houston, 88 Tex. 126, 30 S.W. 912 (1895); Scholes & Goodall v. Hughes & Boswell,
77 Tex. 482 (1890). See also Warren Cent. R.R. v. Texas Creosoting Co., 62 S.W.2d 691
(Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
6
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5453 (1) (1958). It should be noted that under the
special statutes relating to liens on mineral properties the original contractor may obtain
a statutory lien by filing his verified account within six months after the indebtedness
accrues.
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of the contract, or when the work was performed, or the material
furnished,"3 although it is possible that these times may coincide.
Thus, if the owner and a contractor should enter into a contract for
the building of a house and should provide that payment should be
made one year after the work was completed, the contractor has four
months after the date of the accrual of the indebtedness, which, in
the hypothetical situation, would be sixteen months from the time
of completion of the house, in order to file his contract. The four-
month period is calculated on the basis of calendar months. Thus, if
the indebtedness fell due on February 28, the last day for filing
would be June 28."
In making a study of the steps necessary to acquire the statutory
lien, it is necessary to distinguish between original contractors, or
those dealing directly with the owner, and derivative claimants. The
statutory procedure discussed above, by which the constitutional
lien can be perfected, also governs the acquisition of statutory liens
by original contractors. One who furnishes tools or who makes or
repairs some improvement other than an article or building, as has
been observed, does not obtain a constitutional lien even though he
may be an original contractor. Yet, if he files his written contract or
itemized account within four months after the accrual of the in-
debtedness, he obtains a statutory lien."a When the statutory lien is
sought, however, the liberal construction indulged in the case of the
constitutional lien is abandoned and a strict construction of the
statutory requirements substituted, even in the case of original con-
tractors."8 The statutes do not seem to require that an original con-
tractor give any type of notice to the owner in order to affix a statu-
tory lien, nor would such notice serve any purpose since the owner
contracted directly with the claimant and presumably knows the
terms of his contract."'
"3 Examples are seen in Hill v. The Praetorians, 219 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949)
error ref. n.r.e.; Investor's Syndicate v. Dallas Plumbing Co., 61 S.W.2d 1039 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1933).
4 See Pitcock v. Johns, 326 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error ref.
"a See Lewis v. Phillips, 131 Tex. 313, 114 S.W.2d 864 (1938); Denny v. White House
Lumber Co., 150 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error dism. judgm. cor.
68 See, e.g., Ball v. Davis, 118 Tex. 534, 18 S.W.2d 1063 (1929). See also Pacific Indem.
Co. v. Bowles & Edens Supply Co., 290 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.
"7See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5453 (3) (1958) which requires notice to the
owner only from those "who furnished material to or performed labor for a contractor
or subcontractor." See also the special statutes governing liens on mineral properties which
require both original contractors and derivative claimants to file itemized accounts, but
provide for notice to the owner to be given by derivative claimants only. Tex. Rev. Civ.




In the case of derivative claimants the procedure differs. Not only
must an itemized and verified account be filed, but there must be one
or more notices given to the owner. Notice must be in writing. Oral
notice, although admittedly received, will not suffice. "s The first
notice mentioned in the statutes is that required by article 5453
(3)." Presumably, it must be given by all derivative claimants,
i.e., by everyone except an original contractor."0 No special form for
this notice is specified by the statute, but it is essential that it con-
tain an itemization of the materials and labor and that it show how
much is due and unpaid. It has been held that a copy of the con-
tract between the materialman and the contractor will not substitute
for an itemized notice.' Similarly, a letter to the owner, stating the
balance owing by the contractor to the materialman, is not suffi-
cient."' This particular statute does not require a statement in the
notice that a lien is being claimed, and since it alone seems to govern
the notice to be given by a materialman, it appears that no such
statement is required of him."
While it seems doubtful to the writer that the itemization of the
claim is of any practical benefit to the owner, it is believed that all
derivative claimants, including materialmen, should be required to
warn the owner that enough should be retained out of the money
owing to the contractor to cover the claim. Otherwise, an inexperi-
enced owner, who is not advised, might be unaware of the signifi-
cance of the notice. The notice discussed above, which must be given
by all derivative claimants, must be given within ninety days after
the indebtedness accrues." Within the same time period all derivative
claimants must file their claims for recording as hereinafter dis-
6SBerry v. McAdams, 93 Tex. 431, 55 S.W. 1112 (1900).
"9Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1958).
70 It is believed that there is little question about the accuracy of this conclusion if
the phrase "each person, firm or corporation who furnished material to or performed labor
for a contractor or subcontractor . . ." includes a subcontractor, i.e., one who has fur-
nished labor and materials to the original contractor under a subcontract. The use of the
phrase "firm or corporation" suggests an intention to include a subcontractor. It is possible
that one furnishing only tools or equipment would not be included.
"' Spann v. King, 121 S.W. 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) error ref.
,' Owen v. Griffin, 34 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931). The special statutes relating
to mineral properties underwent substantial revision in 1957. Among other things they re-
quire a statement that a lien is claimed and a description of the property. The requirement
that the claim be itemized has been eliminated. Tex. Rev. Stat. Ann. art. 5476c (1958).
"' In the case of mineral properties all derivative claimants must state in the notice to
the owner that a lien is claimed. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5476c (1958).
'4 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5453 (3) (1958). The claimant under the mineral
properties statute must give notice to the owner ten days before filing the statement of
his lien, but has a six months' period within which to file. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts.
5476b, c (1958).
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cussed. It seems clear that a materialman may file his claim of lien
with the county clerk at the same time he gives the notice to the
owner, or he may even give the notice after the account is filed, so
long as he does both within the ninety-day period." No further no-
tice is required of him.
To be safe, all derivative claimants other than materialmen should
either give two separate notices, differing somewhat in content, or
should give a single notice containing the additional information re-
quired by article 5461,"' and should realize that an additional time
limitation is imposed. This is because article 5461 requires every per-
son "except the original contractor or builder, or those claiming
under Section 3 of Article 5453," to give to the owner notice in
writing that he holds a claim against the improvement, and to state
the amount of the claim and from whom it is due, at least ten days
prior to filing the claim of a lien with the county clerk. Undoubted-
ly, a single notice which complies with the requirements of both
article 5453 (3) and 5461 will suffice, provided it is given within
eighty days after the indebtedness accrues, so that there may be
timely filing within ten days thereafter. A separate and additional
notice designed to comply with article 5461, if timely, would also
meet the statutory requirement." The only real difficulty is in de-
termining who is within the terms of this statute. In the one case
which has involved the question, it was held that laborers who failed
to give notice to the owner ten days prior to filing their accounts
obtained no liens.70
Article 5461, when read in connection with article 5453 (3), ap-
pears to be without meaning. It will be recalled that article 5461
excludes original contractors and also all those who claim under arti-
cle 5453 (3). The latter statute includes "each person, firm or cor-
poration who furnished material to or performed labor for a con-
tractor or subcontractor." With the conceivable exception of one
who furnished only tools, machinery, or equipment, no one is left
to be affected by article 5461.79
Although the resolution of the hiatus is not easy, the way it came
7' Wilson v. Sherwin-Williams Paint Co., 160 S.W. 418 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913), aff'd,
110 Tex. 156, 217 S.W. 372 (1919). The Wilson case shows that the statement is true
of materialmen who supply subcontractors as well as to those who deal with the original
contractor.7 0Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1958).
"'See 6 Stayton, Texas Forms §§ 3341, 3344, at 324, 327 (rev. ed. 1960).
70 Hayden v. Tyler Oil Corp., 6 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) error dism. See
also McQuerry v. Glenn, I S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) error dism.
70 It is assumed that a subcontractor is embraced within article 5453 (3), Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. Ann. (1958). See note 70 supra.
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about may be easily explained. When what is now article 5461 was
enacted into its present form in 1889, the statute which is now arti-
cle 5453 (3) covered only those who furnished material to a con-
tractor." Thus, only materialmen were required to give an itemized
notice. Other derivative claimants were required to give the differ-
ent form of notice provided for in article 5461, and to do so ten
days in advance of filing their claims."s Later, when article 5453 (3)
was amended to require itemized notices of all derivative claimants,
the inconsistent provisions of article 5461, and especially its internal
reference to article 5453 (3), were overlooked. A sensible argument
can be made that the amendment to article 5453 (3) repealed article
5461 by implication, so that it now has no operative effect. Since
this argument has not been considered by the courts, however, all
derivative claimants other than materialmen should observe the
statute.
Article 5456" sets out the form for the affidavit which must be
filed for recording. It states, in part, that when the claimant is a
materialman, "affiant shall further swear that he has given to the
owner ... notice in writing of each item of said account as required
in this chapter as the same was furnished. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
Moreover, in the case of the lien on the homestead, article 5465 states
that "a copy of each bill of lumber furnished to the contractor . . .
as the same is furnished shall be delivered to the owner." (Emphasis
supplied.) s8 While the language seems to be mandatory, it is settled
with respect to both homestead and non-homestead property that
failure to comply does not prevent the acquisition of a statutory
lien."' On the other hand, it is true that failure to give early notice,
even though it be given within the ninety-day period, may affect
the priority of the claim, or, in some instances, result in a complete
loss of any substantial rights."s
It is important to note that notice must be given while the owner
still has in his hands money which is owed, or which will be owed, to
the contractor. The notice operates like a writ of garnishment, and
if it comes too late it impoupds nothing, so that the lien, although in
80Acts, 21st Leg., 1889, ch. 98, p. 110, 5 3.
81 Acts, 21st Leg., 1889, ch. 98, p. 110, 5 12.
82Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1958).
83 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1958).
S4 MacAtee & Sons v. House, 137 Tex. 259, 153 S.W.2d 460 (1941); Nichols v. Dixon,
99 Tex. 263, 89 S.W. 765 (1905).
8See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Lyon-Gray Lumber Co., 110 Tex. 162, 217 S.W.
133 (1919).
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theoretical existence, is unenforceable." If the owner gives the con-
tractor a negotiable note for the full amount of the contract price
at the time the contract is executed and the note is immediately
transferred to a holder in due course, this is regarded as payment by
the owner to the contractor, so that no materialman or other deriva-
tive claimant can thereafter secure a lien against the owner's pro-
perty." Similarly, if the contractor abandons the work and the owner
has to spend the unpaid balance of the contract price to complete
the job, no lien attaches.8
Oddly enough, a materialman who fails to comply with the statute
in giving notice of each item of material as it is furnished is pre-
ferred over the contractor in a situation where one of the two inno-
cent parties must suffer a loss. This occurs when the contractor pays
a subcontractor in full before the materialman who has supplied
the subcontractor has given notice of his claim. It is well settled
that if the owner still has on hand money owing to the con-
tractor when the notice is received, the notice impounds it
for the benefit of the materialman" Stated differently, the right to
obtain the lien does not depend upon the state of accounts between
the contractor and the subcontractor who is the debtor of the
materialman. This rule was applied even in the extreme case where a
substantial portion of the materials which were sold to the subcon-
tractor for use on the particular job were in fact used elsewhere by
him."0 These decisions are predicated upon the reasoning that the con-
tractor selected the subcontractor to do the work and should there-
fore be the one to suffer the loss."' It would be more logical to say
s6 First Nat'l Bank v. Lyon-Gray Lumber Co., supra note 85; Lonergan v. San Antonio
Trust Co., 101 Tex. 63, 104 S.W. 1061 (1907); Spann v. King, 121 S.W. 207 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1919) error ref.
"
7 Modern Plumbing Co. v. Armstrong Bros., 36 S.W.2d 1011 (Tex. Comm. App. 1931);
Borden v. Tapp, 333 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); McCutcheon v. Union Merc.
Co., 267 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref. See also Continental Nat'l Bank
v. Conner, 147 Tex. 218, 214 S.W.2d 928 (1948).
s See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Lyon-Gray Lumber Co., 110 Tex. 162, 217 S.W. 133
(1919); Harris v. Interstate Lumber Co., 303 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).89MacAtee & Sons v. House, 137 Tex. 259, 153 S.W.2d 460 (1941); Wilson v. Sherwin-
Williams Paint Co., 110 Tex. 156, 217 S.W. 372 (1919); Watson Co. v. Ogburn Gravel
Co., 110 Tex. 161, 217 S.W. 373 (1919); Padgitt v. Dallas Brick & Constr. Co., 92 Tex.
626, 50 S.W. 1010 (1899).
" MacAtee & Sons v. House, supra note 89.
" In Wilson v. Sherwin-Williams Paint Co., 110 Tex. 156, 160, 217 S.W. 372, 373
(1919), the court stated:
The duty to furnish and pay for the material is primarily imposed on the
contractor by the ordinary building contract, such as that here involved.
The contractor selects the subcontractor. If loss must fall on materialman,
owner, or contractor, by reason of the default of one chosen by the con-
tractor to perform his obligation, and of one whose acts are, or ought to be,




that the materialman selected the subcontractor as a person to whom
he would extend credit, and since the loss was due to the selection of
a bad credit risk, it should be the materialman who loses. As a practi-
cal matter, the contractor would seldom have access to the same
credit information available to most dealers in materials. His normal
concern in selecting a subcontractor would be limited to an investi-
gation of competence. In any event, the extension of the rule which
grants a lien even for materials not used on the premises presents
grave dangers for the contractor and possibilities of at least serious
inconvenience to the owner. Of the innocent parties involved, it is
only the materialman who has any means of preventing the loss, and
that is by giving the notice as he furnishes the materials.
The ninety-day period within which the derivative claimant must
give notice to the owner and file his account is computed from the
date the indebtedness accrues. 2 In the case of the sale of materials,
the indebtedness is deemed to accrue when the last item of material
is delivered.9" The parties may contract for a different due date, but
the contract must be specific and definite." Material is delivered
when it is physically placed on the building site or within the pur-
chaser's control, even though it must be further conditioned by the
seller before it is in a state to be used.9" When labor is performed by
the day or week, the debt is deemed to accrue at the end of each
week, and the statute leaves some doubt as to whether the accrual
date may be changed by contract."'
The requirement that all derivative claimants must file their item-
ized and verified accounts within the ninety-day period" has been
a prolific source of litigation. While the statute9" states only that
the account must be "itemized," it has been held that to satisfy this
requirement the date on which each item was furnished must be
shown.9 As stated in one case, "an account without a date would
leave the owner with no means of ascertaining with any certainty
whether the transaction came within the limits of the contract he
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5453 (3) (1958).
93 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5467 (1958). Compare Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.
art. 5476b (1958) dealing with mineral properties.
94 See Matthews v. Waggenhaueser Brewing Ass'n, 83 Tex. 604, 19 S.W. 150 (1902).
" See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hawn Lumber Co., 128 Tex. 296, 97 S.W.2d 460
(1936); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Bowles & Edens Supply Co., 290 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5467 (1958).
" Note that the period is six months under the mineral lien statute. Tex. Rev. Civ.
Stat. Ann. art. 5476a (1958).
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5453 (3) (1958).
" Ball v. Davis, 118 Tex. 534, 18 S.W.2d 1063 (1929); Meyers v. Wood, 95 Tex.
67, 65 S.W. 174 (1901); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Bowles & Eden Supply Co., 290 S.W.2d
353 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.
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had with the builder. 1.0 It has also been explained that without a
showing of dates it is impossible for the owner and third persons to
determine whether the filing is timely, and, if so, as to which items
it is timely.' An account, which omits the dates upon which parti-
cular items were furnished but which does show that the filing was
timely as to all items, may be sufficient.'"° Although the supreme
court once took the position that the affidavit or claim must show
the date upon which the claim became due,03 this was later repudi-
ated." '
It seems to be established, at least in those cases where the claimant
had no written contract, that the account must set out each item of
labor and material separately, and must give a unit price for each
item.'0 ' An example of an account held to be fatally defective for
failure to itemize involved the claim of a subcontractor for cement
work in the construction of a service station. The account read as
follows:
November 12, 1956
Original Slab --------------------- -------- $7,300.00
Additional 10' x 140' Slab on North side at 40 ------------- 560.00
Additional 10' x 10' Ramp Section at 42 ------------------------- 42.00
Sub-total $7,902.00
Credits Received - -------------- 1,500.00
$6,402.00
In holding the itemization insufficient, the court said: "Here there
is no itemization of price or value. Furthermore, there was no itemi-
zation of labor or materials, in fact labor is not mentioned at all.
Neither is there stated the site or dimensions of the 'original slab'
of what we presume to be concrete."'
The cases are in conflict on the question which arises when the
contractor and subcontractor have a written contract for the fur-
' Meyers v. Wood, supra note 99.
' Ball v. Davis, 118 Tex. 534, 18 S.W.2d 1063 (1929).
.s It was so held in Hill v. The Praetorians, 219 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949)
error ref. n.r.e., although the case may be distinguishable since it involved the claim of
an original contractor who was regarded by the court as being entitled to a constitutional
lien. For a recent case applying the same rule to a derivative claimant see Maryland Cas.
Co. v. Barron-Britton, Inc., 327 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), aff'd on other grounds,
-Tex_.., 336 S.W.2d 622 (1960). See Myers v. Wood, 95 Tex. 67, 65 S.W. 174
(1901); Stuart v. Broome, 59 Tex. 466 (1883).
... Ball v. Davis, 118 Tex. 534, 18 S.W.2d 1063 (1929).
'"' Oil Field Salvage Co. v. Simon, 140 Tex. 456, 168 S.W.2d 848 (1943).
°SoUnion Indem. Co. v. Rockwell, 57 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933); Lebo
v. Dochen, 310 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Capitol Steel & Iron Co. v. Standard
Acc. Ins. Co., 299 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v.
Woitaske, 148 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error dism. judgm. cor.
.. Lebo v. Dochen, supra note 105.
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nishing of specified labor or material, or both, for a lump-sum price.
Among the cases holding that filing a copy of the contract is not
enough is Turner Roofing & Supply Co. v. Union Pac. Ins. Co.,' "
in which the court said: "The objects sought to be achieved by
itemization are defeated by a grouping of items so they can not be
analyzed, investigated, and disputed by the owner or surety charged
with the lien. 1. 8 The preferable view is taken in Maryland Cas. Co.
v. Barron-Britton, Inc.,"°0 in which a derivative claimant who had
furnished labor and material to the prime contractor filed an item-
ized account which consisted of his contract to install certain venti-
lating equipment. The items were set out in detail by manufacturers'
model numbers, but there was no breakdown as to price, which was
given as a total sum, and there was no itemization of labor. Dis-
tinguishing cases which did not involve lump-sum contracts, the
court held this to be sufficient. It reasoned that it would be artificial
to require a claimant to make an arbitrary assignment of portions
of the contract price to individual items. The court said: "If any
unit cost more or less than he anticipated, he would be required to
juggle the reckoned cost of some other item to produce the total
figure. This would obviously make his affidavit farcial, and hoodwink
the surety if it seeks for truth.....
If the statutes are to be revised, it is seriously doubted that the
requirement of itemization should be retained. In its most recent
expression on the subject, the Supreme Court of Texas stated the
reason behind the requirement as follows:
If, upon the default of the prime contractor, a subcontractor seeks to
fix a lien against private property under the provisions of Section 3,
Article 5453, it is important that the owner of the property be advised
as to the items of material and labor furnished, and the prices thereof,
for the reason that he cannot be held liable for more than the reasonable
value of such items.11'
While the protection to the owner should not be diminished, it
seems that it could be insured by more practical means. It is unlikely
that the owner will be able to evaluate the reasonableness of the
prices assigned to various items. Certainly, he would be guilty of
rash action if he made an independent judgment, based solely on
107 289 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.
108 Accord: Capitol Steel & Iron Co. v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 299 S.W.2d 738 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1956).
'0' 327 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), aff'd on other grounds, -Tex.-
336 S.W.2d 622 (1960).
110 In accord, see the carefully reasoned opinion by Judge McClendon in Royal Indem.
Co. v. American Dist. Steam Co., 88 S.W.2d 1091 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) error ref.
... Maryland Cas. Co. v. Barron-Britton, Inc., .Tex._-.., 336 S.W.2d 622 (1960).
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the information contained in the itemized account, that the prices
coincided with value and that the account was accurate and the
claim just. Although a formal procedure is provided by statute by
which he may assume that the claim is accurate and valid, and pay
the same when due if the contractor does not object to it within ten
days after receiving a copy of the notices,112 it is unlikely that this
procedure is often followed. Undoubtedly, in most cases, the owner
will pay nothing more to the contractor until any dispute between
the contractor and the derivative claimant has been settled and ar-
rangements made for releasing the lien.
An unduly strict interpretation of the requirements of article
5456,"' which is the statutory form for the affidavit which must be
filed with the itemized account, has also resulted in the loss of the
lien in a number of cases."' The description of the property is a re-
quirement which should be retained for the protection of third par-
ties subsequently dealing with the property, but the most general
kind of identification should serve in a dispute between the owner
and the lien claimant. The statutory form contains the allegation
that "all just and lawful offsets, payments and credits known to
affiant" have been allowed."' Failure to include this statement is
fatal."' Omission of the statement that the prices are "just and rea-
sonable" results in a denial of the lien. 117 A statement that "said
account is just, due, and unpaid," is not equivalent to a statement
that the prices are just and reasonable." ' Similarly, a statement that
"the foregoing list of materials and prices is correct" is not a substan-
tial compliance with the requirement that the affidavit state that the
prices are "just and reasonable and that the same is unpaid. .. .
The statutes should be amended to obviate the necessity for these
formal requirements. Questions concerning the reasonableness of
price, the justness of the debt, the allowance of offsets, and similar
matters are ones appropriate for litigation, but no useful purpose can
be seen in requiring the claimant to allege his conclusions on them
in the affidavit which he files.
.. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5454 (1958). See also Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.
art. 5463 (1958).113Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1958). For the requirements as to the lien on mineral
properties, see Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5467a (1958).
11 See, e.g., Southern States Steel Corp. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 80 F.2d 466 (5th
Cir. 1935); Detroit Fid. & Sur. Co. v. State, 124 Tex. 145, 76 S.W.2d 492 (1935).
"' Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5456 (1958).1 6 Lebo v. Dochen, 310 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
1
7 Detroit Fid. & Sur. Co. v. State, 124 Tex. 145, 76 S.W.2d 492 (1934).
118 Ibid.
.. Southern States Steel Corp. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 80 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1935).
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VI. PROTECTION OF OWNER AGAINST UNKNOWN CLAIMS
OF DERIVATIVE CLAIMANTS
As a general proposition, the owner may safely pay the contractor
any money due him under the terms of the contract, so long as the
owner has received no written notices of claims by derivative claim-
ants."' Even if notices have been received, the owner will be pro-
tected if he makes payments to the contractor according to the terms
of the contract, so long as he retains a sufficient amount to pay the
claims asserted in the notices received by him.1 This is because, as
previously mentioned, the notice to the owner by a derivative claim-
ant operates in much the same way as a writ of garnishment."' It
can impound no more than the amount which the owner still owes
to the contractor at the time the notice is received. Moreover, article
5463 expressly provides that "the owner in no case shall be required
to pay, nor his property be liable for, any money that he may have
paid to the contractor before the fixing of the lien or before he has
received written notice of the debt." ' It appears, however, that an
exception to this general rule is created by article 5469,124 which re-
quires the owner to retain in his hands ten per cent of the contract
price until thirty days after the completion of the job for the benefit
of artisans or mechanics. In the one case construing this statute it
was held that the owner was liable to artisans and mechanics to the
extent of ten per cent of the price when she had paid the contractor
in full on completion, in accordance with the terms of the contract,
even though she had received no notice of the unpaid claims at the
time of her payment."' All parties apparently assumed this result
on the particular point, and the conflict between this decision and
article 5463, quoted above, was not called to the attention of the
court.
Even those owners who have the benefit of legal counsel are re-
luctant to insist on retention of ten per cent of the contract price
for a period of thirty days after completion when the contract is
otherwise. Yet, it seems to be the only way that the owner can be
fully protected. It seems unreasonable to require this retention, which
120 See First Nat'l Bank v. Lyon-Gray Lumber Co., 110 Tex. 162, 217 S.W. 133 (1919);
Nichols v. Dixon, 99 Tex. 263, 89 S.W. 765 (1905); Rotsky v. Kelsay Lumber Co., 228
S.W. 558 (Tex. Comm. App. 1921).
121 Ibid.
121 See authorities cited supra note 86.
113 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1958). To the same effect see the statutes relating to
liens on mineral properties, Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. arts. 5476c, 5478 (1958).124Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1958).
'Miller v. Harmon, 46 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
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results in inconvenience to the owner, the lender, and the contractor,
to say nothing of interest costs to the contractor, for the benefit of
the artisan or mechanic who failed to give notice of his claim prior
to the completion of the project; and this is especially true in light
of the almost universal custom, on small jobs at least, to pay in full
upon completion.
VII. PRIORITIES
Although any comprehensive treatment of the priority of liens is
beyond the scope of this Article, it is necessary to set out some of
the basic principles in order to give practical meaning to the discus-
sion of the manner in which liens are acquired. What follows is ne-
cessarily a sketchy outline.
Article 5468 states that aside from the preference lien for artisans
and mechanics, to the extent of ten per cent of the contract price,
which is provided for in article 5469, "the liens for work and labor
done or material furnished .. .shall be upon an equal footing with-
out reference to the date of filing the account or lien."'... As a prac-
tical matter, the courts have found it impossible to give a literal in-
terpretation to this statute under some circumstances. If there is a
general contract for the construction or repair job, all derivative
claimants who give timely notice and perfect liens by proper filing
are entitled to have their claims relate back to the date of the gen-
eral contract."7 If the owner has sufficient funds on hand, owing to
the general contractor, at the time the notices are received, all claim-
ants will be paid in full."' This, of course, is seldom the situation in
the litigated cases. More often the amount retained by the owner is
insufficient. In such a case, if the owner makes no further payment
to the contractor after receiving the first notice, all claimants will
share in the amount on hand equally on a pro rata basis."9 If, how-
ever, after receiving notice from one or more claimants, the owner
retains enough to pay them, and then makes a proper payment to
the contractor in accordance with the terms of the contract, this
closes a class; and those who gave the early notice (i.e., before the
payment) will share on a pro rata basis equally among themselves,
but those subsequently giving notice will be in an inferior class and
.28 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1958).
".. Oriental Hotel Co. v. Griffiths, 88 Tex. 574, 33 S.W. 652 (1895).
.2 See cases cited infra note 129.
... First Nat'l Bank v. Lyon-Gray Lumber Co., 110 Tex. 162, 217 S.W. 133 (1919);
Rotsky v. Kelsay Lumber Co., 228 S.W. 558 (Tex. Comm. App. 1921). See Nichols v.
Dixon, 99 Tex. 263, 89 S.W. 765 (1905).
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will share only in such excess as the owner may then have on hand
free from the claims of the earlier class.13 If there is no general con-
tract, so that the owner is dealing directly with materialmen and
those who would normally be subcontractors, then the date of pri-
ority of each claimant is the date when he furnishes labor or ma-
terials; 31 or if he does so under a contract with the owner, then pre-
sumably the date of the contract.'
The distinction between the situation where there is a general con-
tract and where no such contract exists, seems to have been drawn
by the court for the purpose of limiting, in so far as possible, the
danger to subsequent encumbrances and purchasers which arises out
of the application of the relation-back doctrine."' It has long been
established that where there is a general contract for the work, all
derivative claimants who perfect their liens within the time pre-
scribed by statute will take precedence over a subsequent mortgagee
or purchaser, even though such person may record his deed or mort-
gage before any lien claimant has filed his claim." 4 This is because
all such liens have their "inception" prior to the date of the subse-
quent deed or mortgage. If there is no general contract, a deed of
trust taken and recorded after the work begins will take precedence
over the liens of claimants who furnish labor or materials after the
recording of the deed of trust." '
The cases seem to be almost uniform in the view that within the
time permitted for the perfection of liens, there can be no such
thing as a bona fide purchaser or mortgagee. As stated in Keating
Implement & Mach. Co. v. Marshall Elec. Light & Power Co.,"'
"Within the period of time allowed by the statute for the lien to be
fixed by being recorded, we think every person dealing with the
13' Ibid.
13' McConnell v. Mortgage Inv. Co., 157 Tex. 572, 305 S.W.2d 280 (1957); Pierce
v. Mays, 277 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), aff'd on other grounds, 154 Tex. 487,
281 S.W.2d 79 (1955). It seems that if there is a general contract, all liens arising out of
the job, even though not based on derivative claims under the general contract, will relate
back to and take a priority date as of the date of the contract. Newman v. Coker, 310
S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
"'See Oriental Hotel Co. v. Griffiths, 88 Tex. 574, 33 S.W. 652 (1895); Investor's
Syndicate v. Dallas Plumbing Co., 61 S.W.2d 1039 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
". See McConnell v. Mortgage Inv. Co., 157 Tex. 572, 305 S.W.2d 280 (1957).
.. Oriental Hotel Co. v. Griffiths, 88 Tex. 574, 33 S.W. 652 (1895); D. Sullivan &
Co. v. Texas Briquette & Coal Co., 94 Tex. 541, 63 S.W. 307 (1901).
"' McConnell v. Mortgage Inv. Co., 157 Tex. 572, 305 S.W.2d 280 (1957); Pierce v.
Mays, 277 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), aff'd on other grounds, 154 Tex. 487, 281
S.W.2d 79 (1955).
36 74 Tex. 605, 608, 12 S.W. 489, 490 (1889). See also Denny v. White House Lumber
Co., 150 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error dism. judgm. cor.; Longhart Supply
Co. v. Keystone Pipe & Supply Co., 26 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) error ref.
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property is charged with notice of the existence of the lien, without
evidence of the existence of actual notice."
In Tomlinson v. Higginbotham Bros. Co."7 it was held that there
can be no bona fide purchaser of property while construction on
such property is in progress. The court suggests in dictum, however,
that this would not be true had the work been completed at the
time the deed of trust was taken, but the cases cited in support of
the statement are not in point. The dictum of the Tomlinson case is
worthy of study. Ideally, all claims to real property should appear
upon the records. There seems to be no probability that this ideal
can be realized, and since a purchaser or mortgagee is put upon in-
quiry as to the rights of persons in actual possession of land, there
would be little additional hazard to the general public in a rule which
would also give constructive notice of incipient liens from the fact
that visible work in construction or repair is in progress, if the rule
were limited to that situation. This would spare the materialman or
workman the expense and inconvenience of immediately filing a
claim in every case, and at the same time give a measure of protec-
tion to those subsequently dealing with the property. It must be
remembered that the time period within which the lien must be filed
begins to run from the date of the accrual of the indebtedness, rather
than from the completion of the job, so that under the present law
there is always the danger of incipient liens even though the work
may have been completed months, or even years, previously. A maxi-
mum period should be specified.
The present rules governing the priorities between the holder of
a prior deed of trust or vendor's lien and subsequent mechanics' and
materialmen's liens seem as satisfactory and fair as any that could
be devised. Article 5459 provides that mechanics' and materialmen's
liens shall have preference over prior liens on the real estate, insofar
as the improvements resulting in the liens are concerned, and that
the liens on such improvements may be foreclosed and sold apart
from the real estate, provided that the pre-existing lien "shall not be
affected thereby.'. 8. There was conflict in the early cases as to
whether the mechanics' lien could receive a priority to the extent
that the improvement had enhanced the value of the real estate when
the entire property, including the improvement, was sold under fore-
closure. The doubts were resolved by the supreme court in Hamman
v. McMullen... in which it was held that the subsequent mechanics'
137 229 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
...Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1958).
"9 122 Tex. 476, 62 S.W.2d 59 (1933).
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lien is entitled to priority only if it is possible to remove the improve-
ment and sell it apart from the real estate without substantial or
material damage to the real estate. In the recent case of Freed v.
Bozman,'4 ° it is made clear that the test is not whether the item is
annexed in such a way as to become a fixture, but whether it can be
removed without material damage to the land.
VIII. CONCLUSION
There seems to be a complete agreement among attorneys who
have occasion to use the lien statutes that a general revision is long
overdue. It is debatable as to whether a clean sweep should be made
of the existing statutes and an entirely new code drafted. It is the
view of the writer that since many aspects of our present law are
settled and are familiar to both attorneys and laymen directly con-
cerned, it would be preferable to retain the existing structure as a
basic outline. This method would have the additional advantage of
less resistance from groups fearful of loss of benefits enjoyed under
the present statutes. While the drafting of amendments should be
done by a committee of the state bar, it should not be undertaken
without close and constant consultation with representatives of the
trade associations in the building industries. There should also be a
partisan representation of the general public or the hypothetical
"owner." It would be too much to expect that any revision could
completely satisfy the demands of all interests or that there would
be any general agreement with the solutions suggested in this Article.
Even so, the product of any careful study would inevitably lead to
some improvement.
140 304 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error ref. n.r.e.
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